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Modal Epistemology Made Concrete 
Many philosophers since Hume have accepted that imagining/conceiving a scenario is our 
prime guide to knowing its possibility. Stephen Yablo provided a more systematic criterion: 
one is justified in judging that p is possible if one can imagine a world which one takes to 
verify p. I defend a version of Yablo’s criterion against van Inwagen’s moderate modal 
scepticism. Van Inwagen’s key argument is that we cannot satisfy Yablo’s criterion because 
we are not in a position to spell out far-fetched possible scenarios in relevant detail. Van 
Inwagen’s argument can be applied to the use of conceivability for everyday possibility 
claims, leaving us with the spectre of pervasive modal scepticism. In order to answer the 
sceptical threat, I combine van Inwagen’s main example with general considerations about the 
nature of metaphysical modality to motivate a version of Yablo’s criterion and show that it 
does not lead to scepticism. One structural condition of p being metaphysically possible is that 
it coheres with a complete reality. This condition gives rise to Yablo’s criterion. However, for 
the criterion to be of any avail, we have to disregard details we are not in a position to specify. 
To account for our practice of doing so, I use Yablo’s distinction between imagining a world 
as determinate and imagining it determinately. I present a condition when we may simply 
disregard details as determinate. The condition results from integrating analogical reasoning 
into the conceivability test. 
 
 
Conceivabilism is one main strand in modal epistemology: we take something to be possible 
if we can conceive viz. imagine it. A certain qualified way of representing that p justifies 
one’s claim that p is possible. This general idea is common to both camps in the historical 
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divide of empiricism and rationalism, though there is considerable disagreement on what the 
qualified ways of representing are like (e.g. Descartes 1985, 299, Hume 1739-40, 1.2.2.8, 32).  
In present debate, there are prominent supporters of conceivabilism. Stephen Yablo even 
contends: ‘if there is a seriously alternative basis for possibility theses, philosophers have not 
discovered it’ (1993, 2). This may seem exaggerated, given alternatives like modal 
rationalism (e.g. Bealer 2004), accounts based on conceptual knowledge (Peacocke 2004, 
Jenkins 2010), knowledge of essences (Lowe 2012), knowledge of counterfactuals 
(Williamson 2007), abduction (Biggs 2011) or a sui generis faculty of modalizing (Fiocco 
2007), to mention only some. Some of these alternatives might be developed within or outside 
of the paradigm of conceivabilism.  
Still conceivability evidence is often explicitly invoked in philosophical practice. It is used to 
support or question variegated claims to metaphysical possibility, for instance in modern 
classics like Kripke (1980), Putnam (1980, 29-30) or more recently in debates on the special 
composition question (Sider 1993, Williams 2006) and on cognitive phenomenology (Kriegel 
2015). More generally, it seems that, if a philosopher not engaged in modal epistemology 
wishes to support a daring possibility claim, conceivability is an outstanding option. Hence 
scepticism about conceivability evidence threatens well-established philosophical practice.  
Furthermore, conceivabilism promises a unified epistemology at least of metaphysical 
possibilities (I shall disregard the issue of knowing necessities in this article, cf. Hale 2002). 
Other things being equal, such a unified approach is more attractive than a piecemeal one. 
This is not to exclude that there are many roads to modal knowledge. 
In sum, it seems a worthwhile endeavour to defend conceivabilism against sceptical threats. I 
shall attempt such a defence against a major challenge that has been intensely discussed in the 
last decades, Peter van Inwagen’s (1998) problem of relevant details. A moderate modal 
sceptic, van Inwagen grants that we know many everyday modal truths like  
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(TABLE) The table over there could have been two feet to the left.  
 
But van Inwagen denies that we are in a position to know far-fetched ones. As examples of 
far-fetched philosophical claims he presents (van Inwagen 1998, 67-68): 
 
(PERFECT) It is possible for there to be a perfect being (that is, a being that has all 
perfections essentially). 
(IMMATERIAL) It is possible that I exist and nothing material exists. 
(SUFFERING) It is possible that there exist vast amounts of suffering for which there is no 
explanation. 
 
Van Inwagen targets modal knowledge in general. Yet his argument is entangled in several 
ways with conceivabilism in a broadly Yablovian version. It draws on the same general 
motivational sources as conceivabilism. Notwithstanding these close connections, 
conceivabilism provides resources for a general solution to van Inwagen’s problem. 
I shall proceed as follows: In section (1.1.), I introduce the problem using van Inwagen’s 
succinct example. In (1.2.), I point out doubts that the resulting scepticism would be 
moderate. In (1.3.), I argue that the consequence should not be to simply dismiss either van 
Inwagen’s argument or conceivabilism. Rather the problem is deeply entangled with plausible 
structural principles about metaphysical modality. In section (2.), I review two main reactions 
in recent literature, (2.1.) Hawke’s renewal of moderate scepticism and (2.2.) Geirsson’s and 
Hartl’s antisceptical arguments. In section (3.), I present my own proposal how an 
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imagination-based modal epistemology should deal with the problem. The proposal exploits 
Yablo’s distinction between imagining a world as determinate and determinately (3.1.). The 
remaining issue becomes when we may simply imagine details as determinate. I show that the 
issue can be solved by heuristics, in particular analogical reasoning (3.2.). Discussing 
examples of analogical reasoning in the literature (3.2.1.), I argue that it should be integrated 
into the conceivability test (3.2.2.). Then I deal with limits and problems of analogical 
reasoning (3.2.3.-3.2.4.). 
. 
1. The Problem of Relevant Details 
1.1. Current Conceivabilism and the Challenge of Being Concrete 
 
Van Inwagen’s key argument highlights the problem of relevant details.1 I quote his main 
example and then present my interpretation of the problem. Van Inwagen refers to Yablo’s 
criterion that, in order to imaginatively figure out whether p is possible, one has to imagine a 
world which one takes to verify p (Yablo 1993, 29-30): 
 
‘p is conceivable for me if  
(CON) I can imagine a world that I take to verify p.’(Yablo 1993, 29) 
 
Van Inwagen does not incur a commitment to Yablo’s criterion, but his discussion seems 
driven by the conviction that conceiving is the salient candidate method for knowing the far-
                                                          
1  Van Inwagen’s argument has been anticipated by Tidman (1994, 304).  
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fetched modal claims he is sceptical about. I shall follow him in this assumption.2 Van 
Inwagen presents an exemplary application of CON: 
 
‘A philosopher will confidently say that a (naturally) purple cow is possible, but he or she will 
not in fact have devoted any thought to the question whether there is a chemically possible 
purple pigment such that the coding for the structures that would be responsible for its 
production and its proper placement in a cow’s coat could be coherently inserted into any 
DNA that was really cow DNA … But if a philosopher has not attempted to do something like 
this, then that philosopher has not, in any useful sense, attempted to imagine a possible world 
in which there are naturally purple cows. Therefore, if Yablo’s general thesis is right…, no 
one is even prima facie justified in believing that naturally purple cows are possible.’(van 
Inwagen 1998, 78) 
 
I give my own summary of van Inwagen’s point. We cannot know the truth about 
 
(COW) There could be a naturally purple cow. 
 
In order to imagine a world which verifies that there is a naturally purple cow,3 we would 
have to imagine how a natural process leads to cow DNA encoding purple pigment, specify 
                                                          
2        Almog (1996, 424) thinks that turquoise rhinos could exist because there are rhinos and 
it is not a condition for them to be what they are not to be turquoise. Almog approaches the 
question by general metaphysical considerations rather than by conceiving. I cannot discuss 
Almog’s alternative in this paper. 
3  I shall precisify the issue: a cow whose fur or skin includes a significant purple 
surface region as a result of natural selection. The latter requirement is problematic because 
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the chemical code of purple pigment within the DNA and make plain that it is cow DNA. 
Since no one can imagine these scientific details, no one is in a position to know whether a 
naturally purple cow is possible. 
One immediate concern is whether van Inwagen’s argument generalizes to philosophically 
interesting possibility claims. I think it does. I sketch the beginning of an analogous assault on  
 
(IMMATERIAL) It is possible that I exist and nothing material exists. 
 
First, one may ask what the actual constitutive conditions of my being myself are. Candidates 
are facts about origin (my parents), constitution (my genome), being alive at some time, 
having a certain array of conscious experience and so on. Then one may challenge the 
imaginer to spell out how these features are grounded in an immaterial world. 
I have suggested that van Inwagen’s argument is related to the deeper motivation of Yablo’s 
version of the conceivability criterion. Both derive their intuitive plausibility from the same 
general considerations on the nature of metaphysical possibility and its epistemological 
consequences. I shall introduce these considerations by pointing to a difference between 
current conceivabilism as exemplified by Yablo’s criterion and (some) more traditional 
versions. In Yablo’s criterion, we have to imagine a world. Chalmers has a similar view: 
 
‘…to positively conceive of a situation is to imagine (in some sense) a specific configuration 
of objects and properties. It is common to imagine situations in considerable detail, and this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cows as we know them are the product of human intervention. But we may think of natural 
ancestors of cows instead of cows.  
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imagination is often accompanied by interpretation and reasoning.’(Chalmers 2002, 149-
150).4 
 
Chalmers is less committal than Yablo, but if it is ‘common to imagine situations in 
considerable detail’, doing so seems a prerequisite of justifying modal claims by imagination. 
A precursor of the view can already be found in Kripke: 
 
‘A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it. What do we 
mean when we say “In some other possible world I would not have given this lecture today?” 
We just imagine the situation where I didn’t decide to give this lecture or decided to give it on 
some other day... in theory, everything needs to be decided to make a total description of the 
world.’(Kripke 1980, 44, m.e.)5 
 
In traditional versions of conceivability, this requirement is not always to be found. Take the 
classical passage from Hume: 
 
                                                          
4  Chalmers (2002) distinguishes between primary and secondary, negative and positive 
conceivability. I confine myself to positive conceivability as a guide to possibility, and I shall 
not go into the details of semantically unstable expressions. The main difference between 
Yablo’s and Chalmers’s accounts is that, to Chalmers, ideal conceivability entails possibility, 
while Yablo-conceivability merely ‘gestures in its direction’ (Evnine 2008, 666). I think that 
approximating ideal conceivability poses the same challenges of being concrete as Yablo-
conceivability. 
5  Kripke denies that one can provide such a description, though (cf. section 3.1.1.).  
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`Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes 
the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely 
impossible. We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a 
mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and 
therefore regard it as impossible.’(Hume 1739-40, 1.2.2.8, 32) 
 
One may wonder whether current practice of using conceivability evidence really abides by 
the requirement of imagining a world. Still it is striking to see expert conceivabilists endorse 
this requirement. There is an obvious connection to van Inwagen’s scepticism. His cow 
example is driven by the requirement of embedding the representation of a naturally purple 
cow into something more concrete, perhaps not a world, but at least into some much more 
determinate scenario.  
These observations give rise to the suspicion that van Inwagen’s scepticism only arises 
because current epistemologists misunderstood the conceivability criterion. Perhaps it arises 
from exaggerated demands imposed on conceivability. This suspicion is further nourished by 
an argument that van Inwagen’s scepticism cannot be moderate. 
 
1.2. The Spectre of Pervasive Modal Scepticism 
 
Van Inwagen takes his sceptical argument to show that we cannot know far-fetched modal 
claims. Still he is confident that we know many mundane modal claims like TABLE, although 
he confesses that he cannot tell how we acquire such mundane modal knowledge. While van 
Inwagen is only moderately sceptical, I shall explore motives for a more general modal 
scepticism.  
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One easy response to van Inwagen is the following: if it is a legitimate move to insist that we 
know mundane modal claims without telling how, why can’t we apply this move to far-
fetched modal claims? Why do we have to use Yablo’s criterion and then get enmeshed in the 
sceptical problem? One way of evading this response is to insist that Yablo’s criterion has to 
be applied across the board. I have quoted Yablo’s claim that philosophers have not 
discovered a serious alternative to conceivability as a pathway to modal knowledge. Assume 
for a moment that there is no alternative. Then the spectre of pervasive modal scepticism 
arises. Heimir Geirsson has pointed out that van Inwagen’s argument also applies in cases like 
TABLE. We may be challenged to represent in detail the full molecular structure of some 
reality where the table is placed two feet to the left, at least in the small region that will 
clearly be different from actuality. We cannot do that, and hence we cannot know TABLE, or 
so it seems. 
Geirsson’s own examples are the following: 
 
(RECORD) There could be a record-player which is completely free of background noises.  
(KENNEDY) Kennedy could have died from natural causes. 
 
To Geirsson, we can know RECORD and KENNEDY. However, just as in the case of COW, 
in order to know that there could be a noise-free record-player, 
 
‘one would have to imagine the details of the technology that allows one to play records 
without background noise, and it is implausible to assume that anyone can do so.’(Geirsson 
2005, 287) 
 
Imagining the Kennedy scenario 
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‘... involves, for example, imagining how the course of U.S. history, and world history, might 
have been had Kennedy not been shot. In addition to that, it would involve imagining some 
detail about the lives of those close to Kennedy... Might Jackie have married Onassis, and if 
so, what might the wedding ceremony have been like?’(Geirsson 2005, 288) 
 
Geirsson uses his examples to argue that the standards employed by van Inwagen are 
excessive. Thus Geirsson rejects the requirement to specify the DNA of a naturally purple 
cow as overdemanding.  
On the one hand, pervasive modal scepticism clearly is unattractive. On the other hand, I 
report a differentiated set of intuitions. I am adamant that TABLE is true. As for KENNEDY, 
I also tend to dismiss a request for details about world history or Jackie and Onassis. As for 
RECORD, I feel mildly puzzled about the technical details. As for COW, van Inwagen’s 
insistence on specifying cow DNA really makes me uncertain.  
I shall try to account for these differentiated intuitions. My general suggestion is that they 
testify to the relevance of being concrete, as captured by Yablo’s criterion, but that the 
requirement of being concrete has to be qualified. However, in the next section I shall first 
consider a general motivation of the criterion by our understanding of metaphysical modality. 
 
1.3. Why To Be Concrete 
 
I introduce my motivational consideration by the following metaphysical question: what is it 
for some p to be metaphysically possible? While a general account of metaphysical modality 
is far beyond my scope, one independently plausible structural requirement looms in the 
background of Yablo’s criterion. It is captured by the following claim: 
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‘Maximally specific ways the world could have been are commonly called ‘possible worlds.’ 
The apparatus of possible worlds allows us to introduce a set of modal notions: a proposition 
is necessary just in case it is true in all possible worlds, a proposition is possible just in case it 
is true in some possible worlds, and it is contingent just in case it is true in some but not all 
possible worlds.’(Kment 2012) 
 
From this quote, we can derive the following structural requirement: 
 
(DETERMINACY) p is possible iff it is true at a possible world.6 
 
There are several uncertainties about DETERMINACY, which I can only mention without 
thoroughly discussing them.  
Firstly, is DETERMINACY really a matter of course? Modalists like Bueno and Shalkowski, 
who generally reject the possible worlds-framework and think that modality is primitive, 
would reject DETERMINACY. However, they are also sceptical about more demanding 
philosophical possibility claims (Bueno and Shalkowski 2015, 671).7 There are concerns that 
such claims become unintelligible if metaphysical modality is primitive. Since they are the 
main rationale for coming up with the notion of metaphysical possibility in the first place, the 
modalist position may lead to questioning the very usefulness of this notion. 
Secondly, in CON, Yablo only talks of imagining a world. Yablo adds that a world has to be 
‘complete in every respect: spatially, temporally, and ontologically, for instance’(Yablo 1993, 
                                                          
6  In Kment (2014, ch. 4-5), worlds are classes of Russellian propositions which 
describe reality in maximal detail. Worlds do not have to be metaphysically possible. 
7   Moreover, there are doubts whether Bueno and Shalkowski really have in mind the 
same kind of modality as Yablo, van Inwagen &co (cf. Bueno and Shalkowski 2015, 679). 
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29). However, it has been argued that completeness is not sufficient for a world to be possible 
(Fiocco 2007, 369). A plausible requirement is that no contradiction should be true of a 
possible world. I shall make do with this requirement, but further conditions may have to be 
added. 
I have introduced DETERMINACY as a structural requirement for metaphysical possibility. I 
shall now draw an epistemological lesson. DETERMINACY sets a standard for justifying 
claims to possibility. Judging from DETERMINACY, in claiming p to be possible, one 
commits oneself to the possibility of a world verifying p. The rationale of conceivabilism is 
that one represents what one claims to be possible. If conceivability is to provide evidence for 
a world being possible, one has to represent that world. 
Reflections of this requirement can be found especially in the quotes from Yablo, Chalmers 
and Kripke from section (1.1.). I shall formulate a Yablovian condition of justification: 
 
(CONCRETION) One is justified to believe that p is possible if one entertains a suitably 
concrete and consistent representation of a world which one takes to verify p. 
 
One major aim of Yablo is to account for modal error.8 In how far does my proposal live up to 
that aim? My proposal is reconcilable with several explanations of modal error. 
CONCRETION figures in some of them.  
The main source of error I am interested in is that one fails to satisfy CONCRETION because 
one’s representation of a world is not sufficiently concrete. Other sources of error can be 
reconciled with satisfying CONCRETION. Consider Kripke’s strategy of explaining 
conceivability-based modal error: one takes the imagined scenario to verify p, but in fact the 
imagined scenario only verifies p´. The plausibility of the strategy depends on how easy it is 
                                                          
8 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this. 
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to confuse scenarios which verify p with scenarios which verify p´. To give an example: 
assume material constitution is necessary. Mary knows that the table in front of her is made of 
wood. However, she convinces herself that it could be made of ice by imagining a qualitative 
facsimile of her situation in which the table in front of her is made of ice (cf. Kripke 1980, 
114). Her error can be explained as follows: she confuses her consistent and suitably concrete 
imagination of a situation in which she has a duplicate table in front of her and the 
imagination of a situation in which this table (actually in front of her) is made of ice.9 
In other cases, modal error may be traceable to ignorance of facts: assume George, who does 
not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus, entertains a consistent and sufficiently detailed 
representation of a world in which the heavenly body visible in the evening is different from 
the heavenly body visible in the morning. In taking this world to be a world in which 
Hesperus is different from Phosphorus, George becomes justified in his false belief that 
Hesperus could be different from Phosphorus. But for a world to verify that Hesperus was not 
Phosphorus, it would have to be a world in which Hesperus was different from itself. And 
there can be no suitably detailed and consistent representation of such a world. In this case, 
ignorance of the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus plays a key role in explaining modal error. 
In sum, CONCRETION is compatible with several patterns of explaining modal error. 
Whenever one comes up with a claim to possibility, one may be challenged to tell why one 
does not have to specify a certain relevant detail to satisfy CONCRETION. Van Inwagen’s 
argument can be seen as an application of this general scheme. Surely a naturally purple cow 
                                                          
9 Yablo (2006) argues that the standards for a facsimile situation are high. The situation must 
be indistinguishable from the original for Mary with her sensibilities undisturbed under 
standard circumstances of their use. He doubts that Kripke’s strategy works for examples like 
‘heat could be low instead of high mean molecular motion’. 
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must have a determinate DNA to form part of a concrete reality. If one endorses COW, one 
may be challenged to tell why one does not have to specify the DNA. 
I have confined my attention to conceivabilism. While I do not claim that van Inwagen’s 
problem arises for any positive modal epistemology, it tends to spread. Take Williamson’s 
(2007) counterfactual-based theory: First one supposes p to be true, and then the 
counterfactual supposition is imaginatively developed in order to see whether a contradiction 
ensues. In order to test whether COW, we have to develop the counterfactual supposition that 
there is a naturally purple cow. But when does a development count as sufficient? Against 
Williamson, van Inwagen may insist that one has to elaborate what genome a naturally purple 
cow would (or at least might) have. 
Summarizing: on the one hand, CONCRETION seems well-motivated as a principle behind 
current versions of conceivabilism. On the other hand, it raises the spectre of pervasive modal 
scepticism. Before providing my own answer to the sceptical threat, I shall critically review 
extant reactions in the literature. 
 
2. Extant Reactions in the Literature 
2.1. A Moderately Sceptical Reaction 
 
Peter Hawke (2011) has given van Inwagen’s sceptical argument a new twist. He presents the 
following tight conditions for an imagined scenario to provide evidence that p is possible: p 
has to be logically entailed by a set of other propositions p1,… pn, which are all true in the 
imagined scenario. Each of these propositions has to be ‘less modally controversial’ than p 
(Hawke 2011, 359). Details matter as far as the imagined scenario has to be sufficiently rich 
to entail p. Hawke agrees with van Inwagen that some everyday modal claims satisfy this 
condition, but far-fetched philosophical possibility claims do not.  
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Here is the rub: Hawke demands that any single member of the relevant set p1,… pn be ‘less 
modally controversial’ than p. Although this sounds like a strong requirement, it is clearly too 
weak. Each proposition in the set may be non-controversially possible, taken individually, but 
nothing follows for their conjunction. Instead of the individual conjuncts taken separately, we 
would have to establish the conjunction as non-controversial first. However, since the 
conjunction is to entail p, it can be expected to be at least as controversial as p itself. We 
might find the conjunction non-controversial as long as we do not attend to p. But as soon as 
we infer p, the conjunction should become controversial. Hence I do not see how we might 
use it to establish the possibility of p. 
One source of the problem lies in Hawke’s insistence that p must be entailed by the scenario 
without being stipulated. I distinguish two ways for p to be modally imagined/conceived. The 
first way is that some scenario spontaneously strikes us as a scenario verifying p. This does 
not always require an entailment relation. For instance, a Gettier scenario may be found 
modally uncontroversial and at the same time spontaneously strike us as verifying that the 
protagonist has justified true belief without knowledge (NKJTB). A scenario like this may 
convince us that a case of NKJTB is possible. However, a normal Gettier description does not 
entail that the subject has NKJTB (cf. Williamson 2007, 285). 
The second way for p to be imagined is by stipulation.10 Pace Hawke, when we use 
imagination to figure out whether p is possible, we will often stipulate that p and then add 
certain relevant details in order to test whether there is a way for p to be part of a concrete 
                                                          
10  My distinction is similar to Kung’s (2016) distinction of imagistic and assigned 
content. To Kung, assigned content either is simply stipulated or comes as a spontaneous 
‘label’. For instance, an image popping up in your head may spontaneously be taken to show 
your grandmother. Yet I do not think that labelling covers all ways in which a scenario can be 
spontaneously taken for a scenario that verifies p.  
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reality. To illustrate the role of stipulations in the literature, I point to Kripke’s (1980, 44) 
claim that possible scenarios are stipulated. Not everything may be freely stipulated for 
imagination to provide modal knowledge. But rather than p, the proposition to be tested for its 
possibility, the limits of stipulation concern ways for p to be concrete. In order to find out 
whether COW, we may stipulate that there be a naturally purple cow, and we may fill in 
certain details by stipulation, but we may not stipulate that the cow does not have DNA. 
Proper conceiving must be constrained by an awareness of such limitations. Again I draw an 
analogy between the conceivability test and Williamson’s (2007) counterfactual-based theory. 
The role of a counterfactual supposition is relevantly similar to the role of stipulation in modal 
imagination. Hawke’s ban on stipulation is unmotivated. 
I close with an important insight of Hawke’s, which I shall build on. According to Hawke, the  
individual propositions p1,… pn forming the conjunction which is to entail the modally 
controversial p are established as modally uncontroversial by their relevant similarity to 
actual facts. However, the role of similarity is highly restricted (Hawke 2011, 361). As I shall 
argue, similarity to modally uncontroversial features of reality plays a broader role in heuristic 
techniques of making p-scenarios concrete. 
 
2.2. Antisceptical Reactions 
 
I shall now turn to authors who reject van Inwagen’s scepticism, in particular Geirsson (2005) 
and Hartl (2016). Geirsson rejects CONCRETION, pointing out that van Inwagen’s 
scepticism tends to spread (cf. 1.2.). Geirsson’s view is that any imagining that p provides 
some justification for believing p to be possible. Justification gradually increases with filling 
in relevant details, but it remains defeasible by evidence which either directly undermines it or 
independently supports the necessity of not-p.  
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My doubts concern the part about imagination. As sceptics about the comprehensive role of 
Yablovian imagination have pointed out, imagination is not always constrained by 
metaphysical modality (e.g. Tidman 1994, Byrne 2007, Fiocco 2007, Kung 2010, 2016):  
 
‘I imagine myself receiving the Fields medal for proving Goldbach’s conjecture. … I imagine 
(and I suggest that you have imagined too) that I really have proved it. I can also engage in a 
similar imaginative project: I can imagine disproving Goldbach’s conjecture.’(cf. Kung 2016, 
96).  
 
We can imagine the falsity of Goldbach’s Conjecture, for instance in a piece of fiction. But 
we do not thereby get evidence that Goldbach’s Conjecture could be false. 
One may reply that there is a salient defeater whenever the function of imagination is not 
properly constrained, but the reply would misconstrue the point: sometimes imagining that p 
provides no justification to begin with, not even defeasible justification. Pace Geirsson, there 
are exercises of imagining that p which do not provide any justification that p is possible. 
They are not in the business of doing so: ‘…there are kinds of conceivability that do not 
portray p as possible…’(Yablo 1993, 5) 
Sceptics about modal imagination tend to neglect that imagination serves many purposes; it 
can be subject to many constraints and success conditions (cf. Kind 2016). But it will not do 
to simply say that imagination that p provides justification that p is possible unless there is a 
salient defeater. A more convincing starting point for confining a properly constrained role of 
imagining or conceiving is the requirement of accurately representing a world one takes to 
verify p as captured in CONCRETION.  
I shall close this section with some remarks about Hartl’s (2016) variant of the view: 
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‘Rather than looking for precise criteria about the extent to which a possible world must be 
conceived, we need to rely on a more detailed and coherent view of how defeaters work in the 
modal context… in absence of proper defeaters Yablo-style conceivability does justify the 
belief that the conceived scenario is possible. The burden of proof is always on sceptic’s side: 
to reject a given possibility claim, the sceptic should find a defeater for that particular 
possibility claim.’(Hartl 2016, 280) 
 
The problem with this passage is what ‘Yablo-style conceivability’ is supposed to be. The key 
condition that defines Yablo-conceivability is CON: imagine a world you take to verify that p. 
I grant that, once we Yablo-imagine that p, defeaters may roughly play the role envisaged by 
Geirsson and Hartl. But van Inwagen does not target justification already provided by Yablo-
conceiving. He raises doubts that a naturally purple cow is Yablo-conceivable in the first 
place, and here the burden of proof is on the side of the imaginer. Hartl provides no answer 
how we are supposed to meet Yablo’s requirement of imagining a world that we take to verify 
p, nor does he come up with a convincing candidate for a weaker condition of modal 
justification than CON. My task in the next section is to explain how we can meet the 
conditions of Yablo-conceivability. 
Besides Yablo-conceivability, Hartl offers analogical reasoning as an alternative pathway to 
modal knowledge. I shall argue for integrating analogical reasoning into the conceivability 
test. In any case, this agreement between moderate sceptics and their opponents on the 
relevance of similarity-based reasoning is evidence that the latter will play a key role in a 
convincing reply to van Inwagen. 
 
3. My Proposal 
3.1. ‘As Determinate’ vs. ‘Determinately’ 
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I shall now develop my positive proposal. Starting from CONCRETION, I shall present ways 
of being concrete. The straightforward way of being concrete is to specify details. This leads 
to the idea of a complete, fully detailed representation of a world. However, it is not a matter 
of course that there is anything like such a complete representation, and it would be 
unattainable for a finite mind anyway.  
The problem can already be found in the passage from Kripke referred to in section (1.1.). 
Kripke continues:  
 
‘…Of course, we don’t imagine everything that is true or false, but only those things relevant 
to my giving the lecture; but, in theory, everything needs to be decided to make a total 
description of the world. We can’t really imagine that except in part; that, then, is a “possible 
world”.’(Kripke 1980, 44) 
 
Kripke’s remark is puzzling. He might be understood as saying that a possible world is only 
part of a determinate reality. But then of course the question becomes how to deal with his 
admitting that, ‘in theory, everything needs to be decided’. The considerations to come are my 
proposal how to deal with this puzzle. 
Perhaps the most important clue is Yablo’s distinction between imagining a world 
determinately and merely imagining a world as determinate. One may imagine a tiger and 
count each of the tiger’s stripes, and one may merely imagine a tiger with a determinate 
number of stripes without specifying how many stripes it has (Yablo 1993, 37). Imagining a 
world as determinate in respect R (the number of stripes) sometimes allows to discharge the 
requirement of being concrete about R (counting stripes). Often we feel that some parts of a 
world simply do not bear on whether p. When I consider TABLE, what happens outside a 
range of several square meters seems irrelevant. As for KENNEDY, if someone were to ask 
for American history up to Kennedy’s birth or Jackie’s relationship to Onassis after 
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Kennedy’s natural death, we would dismiss such questions as beside the point. We may 
imagine irrelevant parts of the world as determinate. 
However, Yablo’s distinction so far is underdeveloped. The criterion of imaginability would 
be trivialized if we could simply disregard any neuralgic detail as determinate. Yablo does not 
tell when the ‘as determinate’-clause may be invoked in a non-trivializing way. Even the 
irrelevance presumptions of common sense are not a matter of course: to Spinoza and Leibniz, 
everything is metaphysically entangled. The question is how to account for these 
presumptions. I shall elaborate one exemplary heuristic tool that provides guidance when we 
may simply imagine details as determinate but not determinately. 
The heuristics to be considered are not an ad hoc fix. Whenever we dwell on hypothetical 
scenarios, be it in judging issues of possibility, in thought experimental reasoning, in reading 
novels, cooking recipes or whatever, we often feel the need to settle certain details beyond the 
explicit description we are given and leave other details unspecified (cf. Jackson 2011, 478). 
Even a sceptic about modal knowledge is faced with the question of how to account for this 
general practice. There may well be different mechanisms involved for different kinds of 
scenarios, but it would be arbitrary to insist that there are such mechanisms for thought 
experiments and fictions but not for modal imagination. In the following, I develop one 
salient mechanism. 
 
3.2. The Modal Role of Analogical Reasoning 
3.2.1. Extant Research 
 
My candidate for the heuristic at stake is analogical reasoning. I am open to the idea that there 
are other mechanisms involved. I start with a motivational consideration: analogical reasoning 
is widely accepted to play a key role in a field closely related to modal epistemology: the 
semantics of counterfactuals. Though intensely debated, the Lewisian (1986) paradigm of 
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accounting for the semantics of counterfactuals in terms of overall similarity of worlds 
remains by far the most prominent approach, at least in philosophy. I do not commit myself to 
a similarity approach to counterfactuals, but if it works, it supports using analogical reasoning 
in modal epistemology more generally (cf. Kment 2014). 
The salience of analogical reasoning as a means of solving van Inwagen’s problem is 
confirmed by the literature. We have seen that both Hawke and Hartl give analogical 
reasoning a role in dealing with van Inwagen’s challenge. In order to further support my 
proposal, I shall briefly review a recent account exclusively based on similarity, which also 
bears on COW. Sonia Roca-Royes (2017) aims at accounting for everyday reasoning about de 
re possibilities like: John is bald. Hence Jack could also be bald. More generally, Roca-Royes 
proposes to account for the de re-possibility that b could be G by the following schema: 
 
a is actually F and G.  
b is actually F.  
Hence, b could also be G.  
 
a, b are individual constants, F and G are features like being human, being bald. F is an 
intrinsic feature of a, b. For instance, John and Jack are human. John is bald. Hence, Jack 
could also be bald. In classifying a and (potentially) b together under G, one uses mechanisms 
of ‘amplifying’ knowledge of actual facts, in particular induction and abduction. One is 
guided by the following maxims: 
 
(a) There is a ‘nomic’ relationship between on the one hand intrinsic features and on the other 
hand causal role.  
(b) Nature is uniform. 
22 
 
(c) The fewer actual cases of F–cum-G one encounters, the more determinate the common 
intrinsic features F have to be to support modal analogies involving G.  
 
Applied to my example, since John’s intrinsic features support his being bald, the intrinsic 
features shared by John and Jack could also support Jack being bald.  
I think that Roca-Royes’s account has to be integrated into a broader approach: 
Limiting the use of analogical reasoning to actual things as Roca-Royes does leads to 
implausible limitations on considering possibilia.11 This has strange consequences: for 
instance, Roca-Royes takes her method to provide knowledge that Gandhi could have been 
born one day earlier, two days earlier…, as long as embryo Gandhi already existed, but not 
that he could have been born one year earlier (Roca-Royes 2017, 235). Presumably our 
confidence that Gandhi could have been born at a different date decreases the farther the date 
is from his actual date of birth, but I doubt that it makes all the difference whether embryo 
Gandhi already existed at the time or not. Roca-Royes’s method needs to be embedded into 
other methods of modal reasoning to account for intuitions in the Gandhi case.12 
There are further reasons to go beyond actually existing individuals. To estimate how far-
fetched the scenario of a naturally purple cow is, Roca-Royes considers whether some actual 
cows (which are not purple, of course) could have been purple (Roca-Royes 2017, 235). I 
doubt that this detour is the right way of measuring modal remoteness. When dwelling on 
COW, we should be open to imagining an alternate evolutionary history, which issues in 
different individuals. The cows conceived are possibilia. These concerns about Roca-Royes’s 
                                                          
11 I intend to be neutral on the necessitism-contingentism debate. 
12 I only assume that the sharp cut is unintuitive as long as we are not given further arguments 
which go beyond Roca-Royes’s method. Such arguments can be found in (Almog 1996, 416). 
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account further motivate a broader approach to analogical reasoning on modal issues, one that 
includes imagining possibilia. 
My brief discussion of Roca-Royes’s account motivates a broader approach: a heuristic as 
outlined by Roca-Royes is compatible with conceivability forming the ultimate unified 
criterion of metaphysical possibility. Let our reasoning from a being F and G to b being F and 
possibly G proceed via imagining b being F and G. Uncertainties about the details of b being 
G are overcome by imagining the circumstances of b as determinate in largely the same way 
as in the case of a. In this exercise of imagination, analogical reasoning works in a holistic 
way instead of being limited to Roca-Royes principles (a)-(c). As we shall see, the intuitions 
about Gandhi’s birth can be accounted for. Moreover, imagining worlds inhabited by different 
individuals than the actual one is a promising way of addressing possibilia.  
There are further examples of a modal use of analogical reasoning which are best understood 
within a conceivability approach. Hartl (2016, section 5 and 6) discusses Putnam’s super-
(super-)spartans who never show pain behaviour (cf. Putnam 1980, 29-30) and a world 
without suffering. He suggests the following procedure: we start from cases where some 
feature is instantiated and then step-by-step generalize the instantiation of this feature. 
Concerning super-spartans, we start from actual fakirs and fire-walkers and then proceed to 
people who never display pain behaviour. In considering a world without suffering, we start 
from actual cases of people who do not suffer and then step-by-step exterminate any 
suffering. 
Hartl admits that Putnam himself used conceivability evidence in motivating his example. 
Indeed there are good reasons to embed Hartl’s use of analogical reasoning into 
conceivabilism. It is not clear what the intermediate steps in generalizing the pertinent 
features are supposed to represent. One attractive proposal is to interpret them as pieces of 
imagination. One does not simply generalize suppressing pain behaviour or lack of suffering 
to whole lives and populations. Rather one imagines a series of scenarios connected by overall 
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similarity, starting with modally perfectly uncontroversial ones, until one reaches the intended 
one. From some point onwards, one will have to imagine merely possible scenarios. In a 
similar vein, we may start with imagining Gandhi having been born 1, 2, 3 months earlier and 
proceed to his having been born 9 months earlier, 9 months and a day earlier... The process is 
best understood as involving a series of imagined scenarios 1,…m... n, starting from actuality, 
which are related as follows: scenario m seems possible because it may be imagined as -
mutatis mutandis- determinate in the same way as scenario m-1, which is already accepted as 
possible.13 It seems plausible that one’s rational confidence tends to decrease the farther one 
gets from the uncontroversial scenarios one started with. 
I shall add a further example, which even better illustrates why to integrate analogical 
reasoning into conceivability. Uriah Kriegel (2015) imagines a sensory-algedonic-emotional 
zombie in order to argue for the possibility of purely cognitive phenomenology: he starts with 
imagining different subjects who have higher cognitive states but (a) who are neither capable 
of vision nor visualization, (b) the same for any senses, (c) the same for feelings, (d) 
emotions. Then he combines (a)-(d) in one person. As a final step, he imagines what it is like 
for that person to be in a cognitive state. 
Kriegel’s argument has been thoroughly questioned (Chudnoff 2015, ch. 3). I present it not as 
an example of successful imagination, but as a typical (and methodologically unproblematic) 
case where analogical reasoning is combined with an extra effort of imagination. The 
procedure of combining (a)-(d) closely resembles Hartl’s procedure. One starts from modally 
uncontroversial cases (a), (b)... and combines them successively until reaching a case which 
normally would seem controversial. The part about the phenomenology experienced by the 
                                                          
13  A further principle that can be integrated in this way into conceivabilism is 
Rasmussen’s (2014) principle of continuity: roughly, a scenario which differs from a possible 
scenario only in degree is likewise possible. 
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zombie is no piece of analogical reasoning. One imagines the zombie combining (a)-(d) and 
then imaginatively puts oneself into the shoes of the zombie to see whether the zombie enjoys 
cognitive phenomenology. The disagreement between Kriegel and his detractors begins at that 
point: do we have to conceive the zombie as enjoying phenomenology or not (see my section 
3.2.3.)? Integrating the modal use of analogical reasoning into conceivabilism allows me to 
account for a philosophical practice like Kriegel’s.  
In sum, conceivabilism lends itself to systematically integrating variegated tendencies in the 
literature to give analogical reasoning a role in modal epistemology. 
 
3.2.2. Dual Approach: Analogical Reasoning in the Conceivability Test 
 
In this section, I shall present a unified proposal how analogical reasoning can be used to 
imagine scenarios as determinate. I use the examples and paradigmatic accounts discussed so 
far to elaborate the proposal. 
We have seen that several authors invoke analogical reasoning in their reaction to van 
Inwagen’s challenge. Felipe Leon even suggests that we might settle COW by using 
analogical reasoning (2017, 257). I shall consider an exemplary assault on COW along these 
lines. We need modally uncontroversial precedents for the details we cannot specify. Search 
will be guided by identifying relevant resemblance classes. Thinking about COW, we look for 
naturally purple animals which are maximally close to cows in the most natural taxonomy. 
With a little googling, I came upon mandrills, a kind of primate whose skin shows bright 
colours from red to blue. Mandrills might be the natural precedent for naturally purple cows. I 
do not claim that the analogy allows a definite verdict on COW, but it ceteris paribus has a 
positive impact on one’s rational credence in COW. 
To illustrate this positive impact, I consider the role of analogical reasoning in acquiring 
beliefs about the actual world. Your beliefs about cows are partly due to your considering 
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cows as instances of different resemblance classes. Mammals are an outstanding resemblance 
class for cows due to their overall role in biological theorizing. This role is not affected by our 
ignorance about cow DNA. Assume you do not know about mandrills. Your initial rational 
credence in there being naturally purple cows C0(there are purple cows) will be very low 
albeit not zero; you might get empirical evidence that there are naturally purple cows, which 
would raise your credence. Part of this evidence may be information about mandrills, which 
presumably has a minuscule positive impact on your credence (C0(there are purple 
cows)<C0(there are purple cows|there are mandrills, i.e. purple mammals)): if there are purple 
primates, there might be purple cows. This parallel to the role of analogical reasoning in 
forming non-modal beliefs supports that analogical reasoning may play a role in establishing 
possibility. Just as information about mandrills minimally raises your credence that there are 
naturally purple cows, it may raise your credence that there could be. 
However, the parallel is limited. To settle COW, we do not have to consider first whether 
there actually are purple cows. We do not even have to consider first whether the actual cows 
could be purple. The modal use of analogical reasoning is not limited to actual things. And the 
evidential basis is broader than encoded in Roca-Royes’s maxims (a)-(c); it includes any 
theoretical relationships between the items compared. In assessing the analogy to mandrills, 
we rely on everything we know about cows and mandrills. Mammals as a resemblance class 
are supported by biology as a whole, especially general knowledge about taxonomy, genetic 
make-up, and evolutionary theory. Guided by the analogy, we try to imagine an alternative 
evolutionary history where purple genes slipped into cow DNA as they definitely have slipped 
into mandrill DNA. The analogy to mandrills provides a precedent. If we judge the 
evolutionary histories of mandrills and purple cows to be sufficiently similar, we are inclined 
to accept that purple cows could have evolved like mandrills. We consider the minutes of our 
imagined evolutionary history as determinate in the same way as the actual evolution of 
mandrills. 
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Having discussed COW, I shall also consider the cases which gave rise to a differentiated set 
of intuitions in (1.2.), beginning with the unproblematic ones. As for TABLE, any 
experiences with actually moving medium-sized dry goods may be used to draw analogies. In 
a great many of these experiences, moving was unproblematic as long as there was sufficient 
space. The molecular deep structure did not interfere. Hence we may regard the latter as 
determinate in imagining moving the table. The table may be imagined as being moved in the 
same way as other tables before.  
Considering KENNEDY, the overwhelmingly many people who died from natural causes, 
especially in the US at the time of Kennedy, provide a solid base for drawing analogies to a 
scenario where Kennedy died from natural causes. In contrast, Kennedy’s non-natural death 
seems to accidentally interfere with the normal course of things. Kennedy may be imagined to 
have died in the same way as most of his contemporaries. 
RECORD illustrates how analogical reasoning may be integrated into an exacting imaginative 
endeavour. It is natural to start with analogies: there is a good scientific understanding of 
sound waves, and there are well-developed techniques of their manipulation. These 
techniques allow to single out and smoothen disturbing sound waves. We may imagine an 
advanced technique like that. Still there is the issue of integrating the device into a record 
player. For instance, imagine an old-fashioned record-player enclosed in a soundproof bubble. 
The advanced technology allows to detect and perfectly smoothen out just the noise while 
letting the music pass. The technical details are imagined as determinate by analogy, but the 
whole device is the result of a genuine piece of combinatorial imagination. 
Taking stock, analogical reasoning seems to play a pervasive role in reasoning from actual to 
non-actual scenarios. Extant proposals only cover a small and somewhat arbitrary part of this 
role. In particular, they do not cover the integration of analogical reasoning into an exercise of 
imagination. Conceivabilism provides a sufficiently broad and flexible framework for the 
modal role of analogical reasoning. I start from CONCRETION.  
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(CONCRETION) One is justified to believe that p is possible if one entertains a suitably 
concrete and consistent representation of a world which one takes to verify p. 
 
Now I add: a representation of a world is suitably concrete and consistent precisely if firstly, 
the explicit representation of details is consistent; secondly, any detail that is not explicitly 
imagined can be regarded as determinate.14 Any detail that is not explicitly imagined can be 
regarded as determinate precisely if some p-world as imagined seems sufficiently similar to 
the actual world. The background assumption is that impossible worlds do not seem 
sufficiently similar to the actual one. 
Objection: why not the other way round? Instead of integrating analogical reasoning into 
CONCRETION, we may simply ask whether some p-world as imagined is sufficiently similar 
to the actual world. In reply, when philosophers like Putnam want to justify a claim that p is 
possible (super-spartans are possible), they argue that they can conceive a p–world and not 
that some p-world is sufficiently similar to the actual one. This is evidence that similarity 
comes into play only as an auxiliary heuristic tool. It allows you to settle when your 
conceiving is sufficiently developed. But it is only a makeshift. In the next section, I shall 
point out its shortcomings. If we had unlimited cognitive resources, it would be preferable to 
further elaborate our imagination of a p-world. 
In sum, I propose to integrate analogical reasoning into the conceivability test. We have to 
specify our imagination of a p-world until we feel that the rest can be regarded as determinate 
as it seems sufficiently similar to the actual world. One motive for this integrative effort is 
unification. More specifically, we get a plausible dual approach to questions of possibility. 
Everyday possibilities seem unproblematic because we can imagine almost anything as 
                                                          
14 ‘Explicit’ here includes pictorial representation. 
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determinate in the same way as in the actual world. The effort of conceiving a scenario goes 
almost unnoticed as the ‘as determinate’-clause is invoked largely automatically. In contrast, 
more problematic possibilities as exemplified by RECORD and COW or Kriegel’s zombie 
scenario often require an effort which goes beyond analogical reasoning. One may still 
consider almost anything as determinate, but certain details will need special elaboration. 
 
3.2.3. Limits of Analogical Reasoning 
 
In the last section, I have illustrated the modal role of analogical reasoning as a shortcut to 
satisfying CONCRETION. In this section, I shall inquire into the limits of analogical 
reasoning. My result will be that analogical reasoning is highly problematic, but given its 
ubiquity, there is no reason for modal scepticism in particular.  
I shall use the explicit targets of van Inwagen’s scepticism to highlight two exacting 
requirements of using analogical reasoning. The first requirement is that one comparandum is 
actuality. Consider: 
 
(PERFECT) It is possible for there to be a perfect being (that is, a being that has all 
perfections essentially). 
(IMMATERIAL) It is possible that I exist and nothing material exists. 
 
In both cases the availability of a shortcut depends on one’s take on actuality. If one already 
believes in metaphysical perfection, or if one believes in unembodied mental properties, one 
might well find perfect beings and oneself unembodied sufficiently close to actuality. 
Otherwise one might be deterred by relevant disanalogies: perfections and immaterial 
thinking subjects instantiate ‘alien’ properties, which make for highly relevant dissimilarities 
(cf. Lewis 1994, 474-475). In a similar vein, I surmise that the disagreement on the sensory-
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emotional-algedonic zombie may be due to background beliefs on whether there is cognitive 
phenomenology. Disagreement on many philosophically relevant possibility claims arises 
from differences in non-modal background beliefs, which delimit the range of potential 
analogies to be drawn. 
The second problematic requirement codified by ANALOGY can be illustrated by the 
analogy between cows and mandrills: in order to satisfy CONCRETION with regard to the 
problematic p (there are naturally purple cows), the complete unspecified details about some 
world verifying p have to be settled in a way relevantly similar to actuality. Drawing an 
analogy to mandrills contributes to finding a world with naturally purple cows sufficiently 
similar to the actual one. The analogy involves a difficult intuitive trade-off, which rests on 
the whole of biological knowledge, but which one may not be able to fully explicate. 
Mandrills are a better precedent for naturally purple cows than purple butterflies, chameleons, 
or even birds. But are they good enough? Where are we to draw the line between a precedent 
which is sufficiently close and one that is not? ‘Sufficiently similar’ has to be interpreted as 
the result of such a trade-off. The difficulty of the trade-off in assessing COW explains why 
we find the case more problematic than TABLE, KENNEDY, and RECORD.  
The difficult trade-off in the cow-mandrill analogy adds to general concerns in the literature 
that similarities and dissimilarities are often incommensurable. To use Keynes’s beautiful 
example, is a book bound in red morocco overall more similar to a book bound in blue 
morocco or to a book bound in red calf (cf. Keynes 1921, 119, Morreau 2010)? Besides such 
principled concerns, there is ample psychological evidence both for the pervasive use and the 
frequent abuse of analogical reasoning. For instance, when subjects are told two similar 
stories one after the other, they tend to automatically draw analogies and erroneously 
remember corresponding claims as having been explicitly stated (Day and Gentner 2007). It 
has been argued that such fallacies and biases of analogical reasoning give rise to 
philosophical misconceptions (cf. Fischer 2014).  
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The problems mentioned may lead to sceptical worries about the modal use of analogical 
reasoning. In the final section, I shall argue that they do not motivate a specific modal 
scepticism. 
 
3.2.4. Modal Scepticism about Analogical Reasoning? 
 
As witnessed by the psychological evidence, analogical reasoning is so pervasive in everyday 
life that we arguably cannot do without it. Its largely automatic functioning is calibrated by 
experience and theorizing about the actual world. It may be tempered by reflective criticism. 
Everyday heuristic use of analogical reasoning provides a case for heuristically using it also in 
modal considerations. 
Against this a modal sceptic may object that modal knowledge is special. We might be 
especially bad at assessing analogies and disanalogies in the case of far-fetched scenarios. 
When arguing for moderate modal scepticism, van Inwagen draws a comparison to unaided 
perception, which is only reliable at close range. He points to our inability to judge the 
absolute sizes of sun and moon just by looking at them (van Inwagen 1998, 70). Similar 
doubts may apply to analogical reasoning about far-fetched scenarios. 
The argument can be turned against the sceptic. No one would take herself to be in a position 
to judge the sizes of sun and moon by looking at them. This restraint may be explained as 
follows: in making perception-based judgements, we rely on our in-built monitoring of our 
perceptual situation: is it favourable enough for settling an issue? When we look at sun and 
moon, implicit monitoring prevents us from making precocious judgements about their size. 
The confidence we place in our judgement normally is sensitive to this assessment. When 
making a confident perception-based judgement, we can defeasibly be expected to be 
sufficiently well-placed to make this judgement; otherwise we would not feel confidence.  
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In a similar vein, on pain of pervasive scepticism, whenever we confidently rely on analogical 
reasoning, we can defeasibly be expected to be sufficiently well-placed to assess relevant 
similarities and dissimilarities. Confident similarity judgements are often biased, as witnessed 
by the psychological experiments. But biases are negligible weighed against a largely 
successful and indispensable epistemic practice. 
If the moderate sceptic nevertheless insists that the confidence placed in judgements of 
similarity may be trusted in judgements about factual but not in judgements about modal 
issues, she has to face two problems:  
Firstly, she has to give reasons why the modal case is special. The reason cannot be that our 
confidence is likely to go astray in situations where judgements of similarity are not reliable, 
because then the same should go for judgements of actual similarities. We could not use our 
confident judgement to tell apart situations where we may and situations where we may not 
rely on analogical reasoning. 
Secondly, again the moderate sceptic would be faced with the spectre of pervasive modal 
scepticism. We have seen that the problem of details arises for everyday and far-fetched 
modal claims alike. How is the sceptic to tell them apart? The straightforward answer is that 
she has to judge the far-fetched cases to be relevantly dissimilar to actuality. But in order to 
do so, she has to rely on her confident assessment of similarity. 
In sum, the heuristic use of analogical reasoning, though highly problematic, does not give 
rise to moderate modal scepticism. We normally can rely on confident judgements of 
similarity in judging mere possibilities, just as we have to rely on them in cognizing the actual 
world. 
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